Turkey, Iran, and the Kurds: Bracing for Rapid Shifts in the Middle East
Dr. Abdulilah Al-Mustafa – Researcher at Al-Furat Center for Studies
From October 7, 2023, to its first anniversary, the region has witnessed sweeping changes that surpassed all expectations. The conflict between Israel and Hamas has persisted, undeterred by international interventions or diplomatic efforts. Hezbollah, too, has been drawn into the fray, suffering significant and unexpected blows. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes continued targeting Iranian military bases, headquarters, arms depots, and even diplomatic centers in Syria, both before and after October 7. Events took a new turn with two direct Iranian interventions, signaling profound and potentially transformative shifts that could lead to a full-scale war between Iran and Israel.
These developments did not occur by chance. There are both immediate and long-term causes behind them, and their consequences could shape the future of the region if the current trajectory continues. This situation will likely trigger new discussions about the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape, potentially determining its course for the next hundred years. It also presents a rare and significant opportunity for the Kurds, offering them a chance to reflect on possible actions, drawing on the harsh experiences of the past century, which should have equipped them with the political and diplomatic expertise necessary to navigate the complexities of international, regional, and global politics concerning the Kurdish issue.
Currently, both Iran and Turkey stand as two key geopolitical forces in the Middle East, bearing the brunt of the region’s most pressing issues. This can be attributed to several clear factors:
- Their expansive political and military activities beyond their borders, unlike other regional powers.
- Their ongoing disregard for resolving the Kurdish issue.
- Their leadership of two distinct sectarian currents in the Islamic world, a division that has intensified under theocratic regimes in both countries, which has ruled for quite some time now.
The stability of the Middle East is closely tied to resolving these issues. If Turkey and Iran were to curb their expansionist activities, focus on their internal challenges—foremost among them the Kurdish issue—and cease their material and military support for sectarian militias, it would be reasonable to anticipate peace and stability across the region. This would also cut off opportunities for international interference in both countries’ affairs. However, the current reality is far from this ideal, as neither Turkey nor Iran seems willing or able to move in this direction. This suggests that instability will continue to plague the region.
On the other hand, both countries face similar internal challenges, primarily stemming from the weakening of their internal fronts due to policies imposed by their respective ruling regimes. In Iran, the regime of the Supreme Leader has employed oppressive measures against reformist movements on several occasions. The most recent example was the regime’s violent crackdown on the women’s movement following the killing of Jina Amini on September 16, 2022. The country’s dire economic situation, exacerbated by international sanctions, further illustrates the failure of the Iranian regime’s policies and its poor international relations. The low turnout in the most recent presidential elections, with less than 40% participation in the first round, reflects widespread public discontent with the regime.
In Turkey, the situation is not much different. The economy is in a dire state, and the recent presidential elections revealed deep divisions between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his opponents on several key domestic and strategic issues. Both Turkey and Iran also share a major issue: their refusal to engage in serious efforts to resolve the Kurdish question within their borders.
What happened? Who started the escalation?
The attempt to establish new patterns of Arab-Israeli relations marked the beginning of a significant shift in the region. The normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab nations, particularly in the Gulf, represented an unprecedented turning point in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had long been characterized by a narrative of existence and non-existence. This new approach reflects a shift towards a pragmatic vision embraced by some Arab countries, seeking to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for geo-economic benefits for all parties. These new agreements, backed by U.S. and European support, were seen by some Arab nations as a step to counterbalance Iranian expansionism in the Arab world through its regional proxies, particularly under the guise of supporting the Palestinian cause and the liberation of Jerusalem.
The Abraham Accords, signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain on September 15, 2020, with tacit approval from Saudi Arabia, represented a continuation of earlier peace processes such as the Camp David Accords (1978), the Oslo Accords (1993), and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994).
The Indian Economic Corridor, a project with major geopolitical and economic implications, was introduced as a key initiative by the G7, excluding Russia. Unveiled at the G20 summit on September 10, 2023, the project proposed a new trade route connecting the Arabian Gulf with Israel, forming part of a broader network linking India with Europe. This plan notably bypasses both Russia and China, which sparked frustration in Turkey and Iran. The initiative aims—whether intentionally or not—to marginalize both countries by rerouting major trade corridors away from traditional hubs like Persia and Anatolia, and instead positioning Gulf states and Israel as pivotal players in global commerce.
This shift, which effectively sidelines Turkey and Iran from key global trade routes like the historical “Silk Road,” prompted a swift response from Tehran. Iran, possibly in coordination with Turkey, allegedly encouraged Hamas to launch the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, 2023. The escalation succeeded in stalling normalization efforts between Israel and several Arab nations, as well as temporarily disrupting progress on the economic corridor. However, it also raised the prospect of significant regional changes, with the potential for a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, likely drawing in the United States and its Western allies in support of Israel.
Where Are Things Heading?
Iran has consistently avoided direct confrontation with Israel, delegating this task to its regional proxies. However, with many of these proxies now neutralized, Iran faces a dilemma: either take up the challenge itself or remain silent until its allies recover or new ones emerge. Given the current escalation, it is not far-fetched to imagine that Iran might be forced into direct confrontation. If that happens, it is likely that the situation will spiral out of control, with Iran finding itself at a significant disadvantage. Israel will not face the conflict alone, while Iran, by contrast, will find itself isolated, with little to no support against the broader international system. In such a scenario, Tehran may feel compelled to draw in its remaining allies—the Syrian regime, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen—into the conflict. Should a major confrontation erupt, Iran’s internal structure could face severe strain, potentially breaking into distinct regions: Kurdistan, Arabistan, Balochistan, Azerbaijan, and “Farstan,” as highlighted in a warning by the newly elected Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
Meanwhile, Turkey has been maneuvering in response to the policies aimed at isolating the country and diminishing the strategic significance of Anatolia. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Iraq, after more than a decade, was a key part of this effort, as he sought new defense lines against such projects. His stop in the Kurdistan Region was particularly notable, with discussions focused on advancing the “Development Road” project, a rival to the Indian Economic Corridor, and setting timelines for its implementation. Additionally, Erdogan secured security agreements, with efforts underway to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As tensions escalate, it wouldn’t be surprising if Turkish leaders, facing a critical juncture, revisited Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s nationalist vision and sought to craft a new version of the “National Pact” as a way to reshape Turkey’s regional role. Recent actions by Turkish nationalist leaders, such as the parliamentary move by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, and statements from Doğu Perinçek, leader of the Patriotic Party, indicating support for a Kurdish project, suggest Turkey might be inching toward a new approach to the Kurdish question.
Turkey’s gradual alignment with anti-hegemonic forces over the past two decades—marked by its growing ties with Russia, the purchase of Russian defense systems, among other moves—has significantly altered its foreign policy dynamics. This shift was further cemented by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s address at the United Nations General Assembly, where he renewed his calls for reforms in the current UN Security Council structure. Turkey’s departure from its traditional strategy of maintaining a delicate balance and pursuing short-term, mutually beneficial international relationships has left it vulnerable, particularly at this critical juncture. With the Middle East spiraling out of control, Turkey will not escape the consequences. As the current crisis leaves no room for its former strategy of balancing between opposing sides. Ankara will soon be forced to take a definitive stance between two opposing powers, as its political moves and decisions have already shaped its position, with limited room for maneuver, especially when compared to Iran’s situation.
What About the Kurds?
The Kurds now occupy a much more advanced position compared to the post-World War I era, which saw decades of oppression, denial, and injustice. Today, they have established political entities, diplomatic relations, military forces, and alliances that were previously difficult to imagine.
The instability resulting from Turkish and Iranian policies, along with the failure of the Syrian and Iraqi governments to maintain minimum levels of economic security and protect international trade routes, positions the Kurds as a potential alternative. They are seen as a viable contributor to creating stable environments for international economies. This is especially true given the strategic geography of Kurdistan, coupled with the trust the Kurds have earned from the international community and alliances after their bloody battles against ISIS.
Is this enough for the Kurds to become a key player in the new international dynamics?
The Kurdish community faced significant challenges in the 1920s, a period marked by the signing of treaties that effectively dismissed the Kurdish cause. Tribal and regional divisions undermined national cohesion and the necessary sense of Kurdish unity, preventing the formation of a national front capable of overcoming challenges. The Kurds also suffered from a severe lack of political and diplomatic capacity, which hindered their ability to foresee and counter the international conspiracies plotted against them. This, combined with poor social and economic conditions and weak political, social, and military organization, left the Kurdish cause vulnerable.
The current fragmentation within the Kurdish political landscape bears striking similarities to the tribal and regional divisions that plagued the Kurds in the 1920s. These divisions remain a critical weakness, one that hostile forces are quick to exploit as a fatal flaw. This vulnerability allows adversaries to infiltrate and undermine Kurdish unity, especially at this crucial time when solidarity is needed more than ever. The disunity threatens to derail Kurdish efforts, as it offers an entry point for those seeking to fracture the Kurdish front, making it imperative for all Kurdish factions to collaborate and consolidate their efforts.
Today, the Kurds must embrace a high degree of pragmatism and flexibility, moving beyond rigid ideologies, familial interests, and partisan loyalties. They need to engage in high-level political dialogue and demonstrate a profound sense of responsibility. It is crucial for the Kurdish leadership to hold consultations and meetings to explore the best solutions for the Kurdish issue. Now, as the drums of war grow louder and we inch closer to a critical tipping point, the countries that encompass parts of greater Kurdistan fear a fate similar to what occurred in the 1920s and 1930s—when states collapsed and new ones emerged at the expense of the Kurds and the lands they inhabited. For various reasons, which are too extensive to detail here, the Kurds were left without a share in the resulting political landscape.
World War I marked a major turning point in the history of the Middle East, leading to a complete and decisive reshaping of the region’s geopolitical map, which had remained largely unchanged since the early 16th century. Should a full-scale war between Iran and Israel break out today, the Middle East is likely to face another transformative moment, with outcomes similar to those that followed the previous war.
Even if war does not occur, the intense local, regional, and international tensions and chaos could still lead to significant changes in the Middle East. These could range from shifts in the administrative structures of the countries involved to the possible emergence of new borders and maps in the region.