ISIS Revives Itself: The Strategy, Structure, and Contributing Factors
Lezgin Ibrahim: Researcher at Al-Furat Center for Studies
With the increasing activity and attacks of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq, as well as in several countries around the world, discussions have resurfaced about the organization’s attempts to revive itself and reorganize its ranks. On July 17, 2024, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that ISIS has doubled its attacks in Iraq and Syria since the beginning of this year and confirmed that it is trying to reconstitute itself.
In the same context, several reports from research centers and American and Western websites have revealed that the organization is indeed becoming more active in the two countries, exploiting many local, regional, and international changes—especially the international preoccupation with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza—which has given the organization a breathing space it seeks to exploit to increase its activity. The organization considers Syria and Iraq as the ideal incubators for its future plans, in addition to forming a new structure that it relies on to expand globally and enhance its human, financial, and propaganda capabilities.
What are the reasons and implications of the American warning about ISIS’s resurgence? What is the new structure the organization is adopting to expand its activities locally and globally? What is ISIS’s strategy in Syria? What local, regional, and international factors are aiding the organization in increasing its activity?
Reasons and Implications of the American Warning about ISIS’s Resurgence
The U.S. Central Command’s statement confirming that ISIS is reestablishing itself in Syria and Iraq is based on the increased rate of the organization’s attacks in these countries. The statement confirmed that “ISIS claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in both countries during the first six months of 2024.” This high rate indicates that ISIS is on track to reach double the total number of attacks it claimed responsibility for in 2023. According to the latest statistics, “from March 2023 to March 2024, ISIS’s central media department claimed responsibility for 1121 attacks. According to the data issued by the organization, these attacks resulted in approximately 4770 casualties[1], either killed or injured.” This is an indication that the organization has reorganized some of its ranks and is attempting to make a strong comeback, leading to American expectations that the group is trying to reconstitute itself after several years of diminished capabilities.
The American warning about ISIS’s attempts to reconstitute itself in Syria and Iraq suggests that U.S. forces will remain in both countries for an indefinite period due to the renewed threat posed by ISIS. This can be inferred from the U.S. Central Command’s assertion that “its forces will continue operations to pursue an estimated 2,500 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate more than 43,000 individuals and families from the ‘Al-Hol’ and ‘Roj’ camps.” [2] This indicates that “the U.S. is sending a message to regional and international powers that its strategy in Syria and Iraq remains long-term”.
It seems that this American message has been received by Iran and its militias in Syria and Iraq. Recently, less than a day after the American statement was issued, Iranian militias resumed targeting the Ain al-Assad base in Iraq with drones and shelling the U.S. base in the “Conoco” field in Syria with rockets, after a hiatus of several months. This could be a response to the American statement that indirectly announced that U.S. forces would not be leaving Syria and Iraq anytime soon, despite Washington continuing talks with Baghdad about the future of U.S. forces in Iraq.
In contrast, these developments indicate that the coalition is concerned about the increasing activity of ISIS and the movements of Iranian militias in northeast Syria. To counter these potential threats, the international coalition forces have begun “establishing watchtowers along the Euphrates River in eastern Syria, within the areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces in several villages in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.”[3] The goal of building these watchtowers is likely to prevent ISIS cells from infiltrating from areas controlled by Iranian militias west of the Euphrates to the east, in addition to monitoring the movements of Iranian militias threatening U.S. bases in Syria.
ISIS Restructures Itself Globally
Despite suffering significant blows following its territorial losses and the deaths of its top leaders, the resurgence of ISIS’s activities indicates that the group is adapting to current circumstances. It now relies on a decentralized management structure, meaning that there are regional leaders who can remain active despite the death of the organization’s leader. However, the death of a leader prompts its branches to reassess their networks and connections to avoid any operations against the organization. Extremist groups, including ISIS, have adapted to the loss of their leaders. Since 2012, ISIS has lost many of its leaders but still persists, which is due to the organization’s backup plans for the case of losing its top leadership.
A report from the American site[4] “War on the Rocks” indicates that one of the main reasons for the increased activity of ISIS is its establishment and reliance on what is called the (General Directorate of Provinces), which was headquartered in Syria. However, new information suggests that it might now be centralized in Somalia. The structure and coordination through this directorate among these provinces have led to an increase in the group’s activities across financial, military, and operational planning and execution levels in any chosen location worldwide. The report emphasizes that the shift of centralization from Syria and Iraq and the restructuring of the provinces is the reason for seeing more interaction and connection among its various provinces today compared to the past. The group has managed to develop its activities in several aspects, most notably (governance, funding, recruiting foreign fighters, and external operations).
In the same context, estimates indicate that the reorganization of its provinces began after the group lost its territories in Syria and Iraq. This is supported by the fact that since 2018, the group has stopped naming its multiple “provinces” in Iraq (Baghdad, North Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Nineveh, South, Fallujah, Dijla, and Jazira) and in Syria (Raqqa, Baraka, Kheir, Homs, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Sham, Latakia, and Euphrates). Today, the group only refers to these provinces as the “Wilayah of Sham” and “Wilayah of Iraq”, and all the “Islamic State” provinces are now on an equal footing with each other[5]. But the question is, how does ISIS manage these provinces?
The Organizational and Executive Structure of ISIS Provinces
The group currently manages its branches through what is called the “Delegated Committee,” which is the highest authority within ISIS. Each member of this committee is responsible for an executive aspect and oversees the Directorate of Provinces, which in turn supervises local officials. More specifically, each committee member is “responsible for one of the following portfolios: security, safe havens, religious affairs, media, and finance”[6].
With the establishment of the General Directorate of Provinces, an overarching structure was created that now oversees the provinces. This Directorate has its own offices, and based on leaked internal documents from the group, this structure includes seven[7] offices :
– Office of the Blessed Land: Responsible for overseeing the group’s activities in Iraq and Syria.
– Office of Al-Sadiq: Covers Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, and the rest of South Asia.
– Office of Al-Karrar: Manages Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and other parts of East, Central, and Southern Africa.
– Office of Al-Furqan: Oversees the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel.
– Office of Umm Al-Qura: Supervises Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf.
– Office of Dhu Al-Nurayn: Focuses on Egypt and Sudan.
– Office of Al-Farouq: Organizes Turkey, Georgia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe.
Each leader of ISIS’s provinces reports to the head of the office they belong to within the “General Directorate of Provinces,” which then relays information to the Delegated Committee and eventually to the group’s leader.
It appears that ISIS has rebuilt itself over the past five years, but in a more complex manner than before. The way it has rebuilt itself differs from how it resurfaced over a decade ago in Iraq and Syria, where the group primarily focused on territorial control in those countries. Now, it has adopted a global dimension by expanding in all directions and dividing the world into provinces, regardless of geographical control.
While the world’s attention was directed toward Syria and Iraq, considering them the primary source of the group’s threat, especially with thousands of ISIS members detained and thousands of their families held in camps, warnings of a “ticking time bomb” in northeast Syria were issued. However, it was unexpected for an explosion to occur in Moscow with the deadly attack on the Krux City base in March 2024, or in Iran when the group targeted people during the anniversary of “Quds Force” commander Qassem Soleimani’s death in Kerman, and the recent attack on a Shia gathering during the Ashura commemoration in Muscat, Oman, in mid-July 2024. This indicates that the threat of ISIS is no longer concentrated in Syria and Iraq but is expanding horizontally and vertically through reliance on decentralized management.
All these complex attacks, in addition to “the plot foiled by Germany in June 2024 in Cologne targeting the current European football championship, are notable examples of these interconnected global networks”[8]. However, the common denominator among these attacks—except for Muscat—is that the ISIS operatives involved were in Turkey before moving to Russia and Germany. This suggests that “Turkey has become a planning hub for ISIS,” according to a report from the American site “War on the Rocks.” This also highlights that ISIS’s external operations are not fixed in terms of their source; each attack is coordinated through the so-called “General Directorate of Provinces” of the group, with Turkey being one of its preferred locations for management and planning.
There is no doubt that Turkey is a major axis in ISIS’s global network, and the support the group receives from Turkey indicates that its intelligence coordinates with the “General Directorate of Provinces.” It appears that this directorate has become an increasingly important institution within the “Caliphate” and is now allegedly central to executing external terrorist operations. This was revealed by ISIS attacks in Russia and Europe, where group operatives moved from Turkey to those countries.
ISIS Strategy in Syria and Factors Supporting its Activity
Despite losing territorial control in Syria and Iraq, ISIS remains active in both countries. While its activities were previously limited to small-scale attacks, they have now escalated to intensive, sophisticated, and complex operations. This suggests that the group might be paving the way for a “second revival of its caliphate,” similar to what happened a decade ago, by expanding its operations into the heart of its adversaries’ territories and positioning itself in key areas to signal its presence across a broad geographic range. It benefits from numerous local, regional, and international factors, particularly the Gaza war and the escalation of Israel’s conflict with Iran and its militias, especially in Syria.
The increased likelihood that the group is planning to regain territorial control is indicated by its actions, such as “surprising the Syrian army in mid-April 2024 in populated areas along the border between Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces, establishing positions on the vital Deir ez-Zor-Raqqa road, and positioning around two villages.” [9] These attacks and temporary control of several villages may be aimed at media exploitation by the group to compete with Iran-affiliated factions in the region, demonstrating its capabilities, and attracting local populations. The group has showcased its ability to launch significant attacks in heavily secured areas under Syrian government control, positioning itself as a primary combatant against the Syrian regime and its ally, Iran.
Concurrently, the group seeks to maintain its human resources for sustaining its presence, conducting attacks, and managing its activities by adopting a strategy of withdrawing from cities without engaging in major battles following the loss of Mosul and Raqqa. This is due to the difficulties it faces in recruiting fighters. The loss of all its controlled cities in Syria and Iraq led its leadership to invest funds previously spent on services and city administration into redirecting the efforts of thousands of administrators and security personnel to combat roles and recruit new members or collaborators. Several factors aid the group in reorganizing and expanding its operations in Syria, including:
– Geographic Factor: ISIS’s areas of presence in Syria are crucial for reorganizing and restructuring. The rugged terrain and desert environment of the Syrian Badia (desert) facilitate the establishment of training camps for its fighters, aiding in concealment and evasion, and providing space for preparing and executing qualitative operations to confirm its presence. A research paper by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, 2019) indicated that “ISIS’s hideouts in the Syrian desert are primarily concentrated in three areas deep within the desert: the first in Jabal Bishri in the southeastern section of Raqqa province, the second in the Dafina area in southwestern Deir ez-Zor, and the third in the desert between Palmyra and al-Sukhnah to the west, the 55-km belt area to the south, the T2 oil station to the east, and the Faida bin Muin’a area to the north.” [10]
– Gaza War: The ongoing war in Gaza has occupied the United States and the international coalition with geopolitical issues, fearing the expansion of the war with Iran and its militias, especially after they intensified attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. The conflict between Israel and Iran escalated to direct confrontation following Israel’s assassination of senior Revolutionary Guard leaders in Syria, Hezbollah leaders, and the recent assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Consequently, combating ISIS has not been a priority for the coalition recently, a situation the group has exploited to reactivate itself.
– Adoption of the New Structure: ISIS’s reliance on this new structure “on a global level,” along with the decentralized structure and dependence on regional and local leaders, makes the group’s challenge more complex from a security perspective compared to the past when efforts were primarily focused on Iraq and Syria. Today, “focusing solely on Iraq and Syria or any other province without understanding their connections to other parts of the group’s global network will lead to the growth and expansion of the group’s activities worldwide and increase its cells’ capabilities to carry out deadly attacks, as seen in Russia, Iran, and Muscat.” [11]
– Turkish Threats and Strikes: One of the significant factors benefiting ISIS cells is the disruption caused by Turkey’s continued attacks on northeast Syria, including the assassination of military and security leaders who played active roles in combating the group, and the destruction of significant infrastructure and vital facilities in Autonomous Administration areas. This reduces the effectiveness of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in fighting ISIS due to their preoccupation with the northern front against Turkey and its allied factions, diverting attention from ISIS activities, and allowing the group to increase its activity and attempt to smuggle more families from al-Hol camp. Additionally, the Syrian areas occupied by Turkey have become a safe haven for ISIS leaders and members who manage cell activities in northeast Syria from there. Currently, the group heavily relies on smuggling operations to generate funds. “Smuggling networks exist in areas controlled by Turkey in northern Syria. The ‘Abu Qaqaa’ faction and other Turkish-aligned factions support ISIS activities by facilitating the smuggling of people into Turkey, using those funds to finance the group’s operations through drug smuggling, looted Syrian artifacts, and entering the cryptocurrency market to find new ways for money transfer and laundering.” [12]
– Deteriorating Economic and Living Conditions: The worsening economic and humanitarian conditions across various parts of Syria have driven ISIS to exploit these circumstances to intensify its activities and recruit many collaborators by offering them money in exchange for cooperating with the group’s cells. “What has contributed to the increase in the group’s financial resources is the establishment of recruitment lines and logistical and financial routes extending from Africa to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Specifically, ISIS financial entities in West and East Africa have repeatedly transferred large sums of money to the group’s branches in Syria and Iraq.” [13]
Summary:
There is no doubt that the lax approach in delivering decisive strikes against terrorist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda amidst the turmoil, wars, and chaos engulfing the Middle East and Africa will increase the chances of these organizations re-emerging on the scene. These organizations rapidly grow in areas plagued by chaos, conflicts, and economic crises, all of which are currently present in Syria, Iraq, African countries, Afghanistan, and others. Additionally, the lack of cooperation and coordination among countries involved in Syria in combating ISIS due to mutual distrust significantly aids ISIS in escalating its activities and launching attacks, as many of its adversaries in the Syrian arena are simultaneously foes of one another.
The current global conditions of escalating political and military conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa resemble the periods of the rise of organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS in previous years. Moreover, the increasing arms race among world countries, ongoing crises of refugees, food, and energy all heighten the likelihood of a surge in terrorist attacks and the resurgence of al-Qaeda and ISIS on the global stage, including in Syria and Iraq.
Implementing UN Resolution 2254 effectively can play a crucial role in ending the threat of terrorism and ISIS in Syria. By establishing a ceasefire, enhancing international cooperation, involving all parties in an inclusive political process, supporting reconstruction and reform, and resettling displaced persons, it can create a stable and prosperous environment that dries up the sources of terrorism. In this way, Resolution 2254 enhances the chances of achieving lasting peace in Syria and lays the foundation for a future free of terrorism and extremism.
Sources:
[1] – Washington Institute, March 20, 2024 https://n9.cl/xs5l0
[2] – Al-Hurra Channel, July 17, 2024 https://n9.cl/gmbga
[3] – Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, July 19, 2024 https://n9.cl/rxrsr
[4] – War on the Rocks, July 15, 2024 https://n9.cl/7v7vl
[5] – War on the Rocks, July 15, 2024, https://n9.cl/7v7vl
[6] – Al-Hurra Channel, February 10, 2022, https://n9.cl/6qosn
[7] – War on the Rocks, July 15, 2024, https://n9.cl/7v7vl
[8] – European Center for Counterterrorism and intelligence Studies, June 10, 2024 https://n9.cl/ofqzj
[9] – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 6, 2024 https://n9.cl/pe8cn
[10] – Ruyat Al-Ikhbariya Network, January 12, 2021 https://n9.cl/hb7me
[11] – Washington Institute, July 18, 2024 https://n9.cl/2avao
[12] – European Center for Counterterrorism and intelligence Studies, February 4, 2022 https://n9.cl/ox5kl
[13] – Al-Majalla Magazine, April 12, 2024 https://n9.cl/ja5qjz
Translated by: Al-Furat Center for Studies – Translation Department
