Will the normalization between Ankara and Damascus lead to solving the Syrian Crisis?
Dr. Abdulilah Mustafa – Researcher at Al-Furat Center for Studies
Evet are increasingly leading to an attempt between Syria and Turkey to normalize relations and return them to their pre-Syrian crisis state. Reports indicate that a summit between Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is imminent, following several media hints about Turkish-Syrian meetings at the committee level to prepare and pave the way for this presidential meeting.
After differing opinions on the possibility of this meeting taking place, in light of Syria’s lukewarm response to Turkey’s overtures and Erdoğan’s strong desire to meet with Assad, there have been new indications suggesting that this meeting might indeed occur. These include Assad’s unexpected visit to Moscow in the last third of the previous month. The most significant detail that emerged from this visit was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s indication that the region is heading towards a phase of escalation that could impact Syria. This prediction has largely come true, with the escalation happening very quickly and exceeding all expectations—from the “Majdal Shams” incident to the assassination of Hezbollah leader Fuad Shukr and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The region is now on a very hot plate, closer than ever to the outbreak of a regional war in which Syria might not be excluded.
Given these regional risks, which Putin highlighted and warned about, this could expedite the steps toward holding this meeting in August, as hinted at by the Turkish Foreign Minister.
There has been much speculation about the motivations of both sides for rapprochement, but this is no longer the central issue of discussion. The more pressing question now is how all the unresolved and complex issues between the two parties will be addressed if the meeting takes place, and whether this normalization will lead to a resolution of the Syrian crisis.
It is very difficult to predict the course, details, and outcomes of the Syrian-Turkish negotiations. However, by examining the main issues that concern both sides, some key topics can be identified and discussed. Turkey is grappling with the Syrian refugee crisis and the associated social, political, and economic problems within its borders, as well as its greater fear of the Autonomous Administration areas becoming a recognized reality and officially entering the paths to resolving the Syrian crisis. On the other hand, Syria’s concerns lie in the continued Turkish occupation of its territories, Ankara’s political and logistical support for the Syrian opposition and armed factions, and the fear that the Autonomous Administration could gradually become a de facto situation. Moreover, Syria’s economic problems have significantly worsened.
The presidents are not expected to directly discuss these issues during their upcoming summit; rather, the meeting will be the culmination of agreements reached by specialized committees, which are believed to be working intensively on addressing political, security, economic, and military matters.
These committees will need to explore two main directions: first, addressing the concerns and shared threats facing both sides and finding possible solutions, and second, determining the extent of concessions each side is willing to make to ensure the success of these negotiations, ultimately leading to the normalization of relations.
In the first direction, several key issues emerge, including:
– The deteriorating economic conditions affecting both sides, and the need for cooperation to lift the sanctions imposed by international isolation. This may involve finding joint solutions by opening international crossings and revitalizing the movement of goods and traffic through them.
– Updating the terrorism list for both sides and agreeing on a joint list that will identify and categorize terrorist entities, placing them in the “appropriate order” on this list.
– Discussing the status of areas controlled by armed factions and distinguishing between those held by terrorists and those by moderate factions. It is believed that resolving this issue will not be particularly difficult since these factions, both terrorist and moderate, are largely under Turkey’s influence. The only significant challenge may come from public opposition to this normalization and rapprochement. All of this could lead to widespread reconciliation efforts, possibly with specific guarantees or bargaining within the framework of “reviving” the political process.
– The most crucial issue within this framework, and one that is somewhat connected to the previous problem, is the growth and development of the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria. Both Turkey and Syria view this as a dual problem: politically, it involves the Kurdish presence, a reality that both sides have long tried to suppress and combat with all their might; economically, it concerns the fact that the administration’s areas are rich in oil and grain, and contain important international crossings. This could also present an obstacle to Turkey’s “Development Road” project, with Ankara potentially seeking to entice Damascus to participate by linking Mosul and Nusaybin directly through the territories of North and East Syria.
Addressing these issues points in one direction: fighting the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by encouraging armed factions to see the necessity of battling “separatists” alongside Syrian regime forces. This is something the Turkish Foreign Minister has previously indicated. In fact, it seems that this has been planned since these factions were “relocated” (in green buses) from internal confrontation lines with the regime to northern Syria.
However, the situation is far from simple, as many unresolved issues will remain and could hinder progress toward this potential outcome. These include the fate of refugees (both internally displaced and abroad), the missing and disappeared, detainees, the deep social rifts caused by the Syrian crisis, painful memories of mutual killings, desires for revenge, and the widening sectarian divide between the internal conflict’s opposing sides in Syria.
Regarding the second direction of the Syrian-Turkish talks, namely the extent of concessions each side will make, it is evident that the side most eager to achieve normalization and rapprochement is also the one most willing to offer concessions, this side is Turkey, of course. This reflects Turkey’s pressing needs, possibly those of Erdogan specifically, for the restoration of relations, driven by economic, electoral, and other necessities. In contrast, Damascus’s cold responses to Erdogan’s overtures for a return to warm, official, and familial relations have been clear.
So, what are these concessions, and how significant are they?
In reality, Turkey holds two bargaining chips that it will likely use in the negotiation game. The first is its occupation of Syrian territories, and the possibility of withdrawing from them in exchange for certain steps from the Syrian side. The second is its support for the Syrian political and military opposition, with the potential to halt this support in return for other Syrian measures, despite Ankara’s attempts to mitigate the shock for its loyal Syrian opposition.
On the Syrian side, after converting conditions into demands, Damascus’s only real leverage against Turkey lies in maintaining its lukewarm relationship with the Autonomous Administration, and the possibility of shifting and agreeing to confront the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) if such a concession becomes pressing.
Is that all there is to it?
Certainly not. Many significant issues remain regarding the general situation in Syria and its crisis, as well as the implementation of Syrian-Turkish rapprochement and normalization if an agreement is indeed reached. Chief among these is the role of the international community, its official institutions, and the international resolutions they have issued, in addition to the Global Coalition against ISIS led by the United States, and the alignment of Western powers’ interests with the outcomes of this normalization—especially as the Middle East faces the potential risk of a regional war that could threaten the existence of current states.
Despite the international stances and the intense animosity, the two leaders might meet, shake hands, and perhaps even embrace, leading to full normalization and rapprochement. However, the prevailing belief in this scenario is that the meeting would simply be a new version of the many “Astana” meetings, but at the summit level this time, and nothing more. It is worth noting that the Astana meetings, which have exceeded twenty in number, have failed to make any real progress in resolving the Syrian crisis. Most of these meetings called for the restoration of relations between Syria and Turkey, the preservation of Syria’s independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, the safe return of refugees, the revival of the political process, and direct rejection of any form of autonomy, along with the fight against “separatist ambitions,” in reference to the Autonomous Administration and the SDF.
The key to the repeated failure or lack of progress in the Astana meetings lies in ignoring or being blind to the fact that the Syrian crisis has evolved beyond being merely a local or regional issue; it has become an international matter. Therefore, attempts to seek solutions in isolation from other active international powers in the Syrian crisis are doomed to fail, and it is not unlikely that this new rapprochement will share the same fate as the Astana meetings, for the same reason. Astana was essentially a coalition that brought together rivals and adversaries in an attempt to find solutions without Western powers or as an inconsistent coalition against these powers. The current normalization path seems to follow the same approach as Astana, by ignoring the active international powers, most of which oppose this normalization.
Therefore, Ankara and Damascus should seek broader international consensus under UN Resolution 2245 to reach a final solution to their political and economic crises, rather than trying to do so in isolation.
Translated by: Al-Furat Center for Studies – Translation Department