Current Issues

Between Turkish Interests and Russian Objectives: The Future of the Adana Agreement in Syria’s Changing Landscape

The reactivation of the Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria has emerged as one of the primary tools Russia is using to reshape the political and security dynamics in the region, particularly in light of the complex developments in the Syrian conflict. These Russian maneuvers come as part of ongoing efforts to bridge the gap between Ankara and Damascus, positioning the Adana Agreement as a potential starting point for normalizing relations between the two countries after years of entrenched hostility.

In this context, several questions arise regarding the implications of returning to this agreement for various actors in the Syrian landscape, chief among them the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), both of which face growing threats from the potential expansion of the agreement to include Turkish military operations against them. Additionally, Russia’s move raises several issues concerning the Syrian regime’s ability to comply with the agreement’s terms under the current circumstances, as well as its impact on regional and international balances in Syria, particularly given the continued American presence in the area.

Thus, the central question emerges: Could a new Adana Agreement become a tool to legitimize Turkey’s presence in Syria, rather than a means to de-escalate tensions? Or will it open the door to political and security settlements that could reshuffle the cards in the Syrian conflict?

An overview of the Adana Agreement and its Key Provisions

The Adana Agreement is a security agreement signed between Turkey and Syria on October 20, 1998 in the Turkish city of Adana. This agreement is a “security protocol”, meaning that it is not an official agreement ratified by parliament. At the time, it was signed on behalf of Turkey by Deputy Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal, and on behalf of Syria by Major General Adnan Badr al-Hassan. Therefore, the agreement document was not officially revealed, but its provisions were leaked by the Turkish media.

The agreement came amid escalating tensions between the two countries during the 1990s, with Turkey accusing Syria of providing support and facilitation to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), including allowing the party’s leader Abdullah Ocalan to reside in Damascus and claiming that Syrian territory was used as a base to launch attacks against Turkey. By 1998, tensions between the two countries had reached their peak, with Turkey massing its forces on the border and threatening military action against Syria. Under this military and political pressure, Syria agreed to negotiate with Turkey, leading to the signing of the Adana Agreement, mediated by Egypt and Iran at the time, which included many provisions that were considered conditions of submission imposed on Damascus under Turkish threat.

Among the terms of the agreement that Syria must implement are: removing Mr. Abdullah Ocalan from Syria, not allowing PKK members abroad to enter Syria, not allowing the establishment of PKK camps on Syrian territory, and handing over party members detained by Syria to Turkey.

This agreement had 4 annexes, and Annex No. (4) states that: “The Syrian side understands that its failure to take the security measures and duties stipulated in this agreement gives Turkey the right to take all necessary security measures within Syrian territory to a depth of 5 km.” According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, January 25, 2019.

The Adana Agreement: Past and Present Contexts

Amid the current political and military transformations in Syria, the 1998 Adana Agreement has resurfaced as a potential tool for redefining Turkish-Syrian relations. The agreement, which once averted military confrontation between the two countries, is now being proposed by Russia as a middle ground for reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus. However, the present circumstances, characterized by multiple international and regional interventions, make the revival and implementation of the agreement highly complex and fraught with challenges, as its application would entail a profound and intricate shift in relations between Ankara and Damascus.

The notion of Russian efforts to revive the agreement, with some modifications to serve as a form of compromise between the two governments, also requires extensive arrangements. This process cannot happen without full normalization between the states and a Turkish withdrawal from Syria. If Turkey were to agree to re-activate the Adana Agreement, it would likely necessitate its withdrawal because the current context differs greatly from the conditions at the time of the agreement’s signing. In 1998, Turkey was in a position of strength, and the Syrian regime was comparatively weak, for the following reasons:

  • The Turkish military was considered stronger and better equipped than the Syrian army, enjoying full support from NATO, which gave Turkey a clear military advantage should tensions escalate into an open conflict.
  • Turkey also had strong political and diplomatic backing from Western countries, especially the United States, which labeled the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a “terrorist organization” and supported Turkey in its fight against the group. This international support strengthened Turkey’s negotiating position against Damascus.
  • Syria, on the other hand, was facing both internal and external pressures, suffering from regional and international isolation due to sanctions imposed in the late 1990s because of its regional policies. Syria’s weak economic situation further reduced its capacity to engage in a military conflict with Turkey, pushing it to accept Ankara’s demands.

These factors combined to place Turkey in a strong negotiating position, allowing it to impose its conditions on the Syrian government through the Adana Agreement. The agreement’s terms were largely dictated by Turkish interests, and the Syrian regime accepted these conditions under Turkish pressure.

However, the situation today is different, with Syria currently in a position of strength—at least in terms of negotiations. Several present-day factors have shifted the balance of power in Syria’s favor, which could lead to a renegotiation of the Adana Agreement, this time with terms more favorable to Damascus:

  • Russia and Iran have become key allies of Syria during the Syrian war, with a direct presence on its territory and providing significant military and political support to the Syrian government. This support has changed the balance of power inside Syria and restored Damascus’ control over most of the territory. Russia, as a global power, has significant influence on the international stage and is considered a key player in any political settlement between Turkey and Syria. Iran’s influence in Syria may also give Damascus greater maneuverability, all of which strengthens Damascus’ negotiating position.
  • Turkey’s relations with America and the West have declined, as Turkey’s relations with its traditional NATO allies, especially the United States, have deteriorated significantly in recent years due to issues such as the purchase of Russian defense systems.(S-400) and Turkey’s interventions in northern Syria. This tension has weakened Western support for Turkey in regional conflicts, including the conflict with the Kurds in Syria. Turkey’s quest to balance its relations with the West and Russia has made it less able to act freely in the Syrian file without taking into account Moscow’s interests.
  • The American presence in Syria and the transformation of the Kurds in northern Syria into a de facto force supported by the United States and the international coalition represent one of the important factors that Damascus can use as a pressure tool in its negotiations with Turkey. Damascus may use the threat of the possibility of negotiating with the Kurds as a major pressure card in the face of Turkey.
  • Economic challenges in Turkey, where the Turkish economy is facing increasing pressures, including inflation and the decline of the lira, so it is difficult for the Turkish government to get involved in long-term military adventures. This weakens Turkey’s ability to threaten the use of force against Damascus this time, which may make it more inclined to negotiate and compromise.
  • The transformations in Arab positions towards Syria, as some Arab countries have improved their relations with Damascus and reopened their embassies, is an important factor that alleviates the regional isolation that Syria suffered from during the Adana Agreement. This Arab support may give Damascus an additional card in negotiations with Turkey.

Can the Adana Agreement be revived at present?

The semi-official Syrian newspaper Al-Watan reports that the agreement signed in the 1990s may be referenced in the upcoming negotiations between Damascus and Ankara. Citing an unnamed diplomat, the newspaper suggests that “the process of renegotiating and amending its terms may be discussed.” What was mentioned in the Syrian newspaper implies that Damascus and Moscow will attempt to reverse the terms of the agreement and add new conditions that Turkey will be required to adhere to this time. This is because, before the signing of the Adana Agreement in 1998, Turkey had no military presence in Syria, nor did it support Syrian opposition forces or Islamist groups, which Damascus now considers “terrorist” organizations. According to Al-Watan, citing its source, “the agenda includes the need to specify who the terrorists are and to define a mechanism for cooperation between Damascus and Ankara in combating terrorism,” according to North Press Agency, September 3, 2024. This indicates that Russia may push Turkey to abandon some opposition factions and Islamist groups, labeling them as “terrorists,” in exchange for Turkey’s request that Damascus classify the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as “terrorists.”

If the terms of the agreement are implemented today after being amended, the Syrian regime would be the primary beneficiary this time, as all the obligations imposed on the regime under the pretext of “counterterrorism” would now require Turkey to comply with similar demands. For example, before the agreement could be applied practically, the Turkish government would have to officially recognize the legitimacy of Assad and his regime again. This would require Turkey to restore its relations with the Syrian government, reopen its embassy in Damascus, and accept the reopening of the Syrian embassy in Ankara. Consequently, Turkey would be forced to fully or partially withdraw from Syrian territory, and this withdrawal would compel it to abandon the armed and political opposition and close all opposition factions’ camps within Turkish territory. This would not be easy for Turkey to implement, as it does not wish to distance itself from shaping Syria’s future. Abandoning the opposition would weaken its influence on the future political solution for Syria.

Challenges and Risks of Returning to the Amended Adana Agreement

Any efforts to implement the terms of the amended Adana Agreement would depend on the return of Syrian government forces to the entire border with Turkey and the recognition of the existing borders. However, the current control of opposition factions and Islamist groups, supported by Turkey, over most of Syria’s northern border presents a significant challenge to the agreement.

If the agreement were to be amended and Turkey requested that Damascus implement all its new terms, including combating the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, and requiring that they be considered part of the PKK or classified as “terrorists,” Damascus would not be able to comply with these provisions given the current situation. The Kurds have gained military strength, the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria continues, and it supports the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, the agreement could become merely an implementation of the fourth annex, granting Turkey legitimacy to enter Syrian territory up to a depth that may reach more than 30 kilometers this time, carrying out strikes under the pretext that Damascus has not fulfilled its commitments.

On the other hand, implementing the agreement with amended Turkish conditions could mean that Damascus accepts a sustained Turkish presence on its territory, limiting its full sovereignty over northern Syria. Turkey may seek to maintain its military presence by establishing military observation points inside Syria, similar to what it has done in Iraq, this time with a green light from Russia in strategic areas such as Idlib, Afrin, and Ras al-Ain to ensure its objectives of preventing the establishment of a Kurdish entity along its southern border.

Supporting this possibility is the fact that, historically, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned that Russia had proposed to the Syrian regime and Turkey an agreement that would allow Turkish forces to remain on Syrian territory “legitimately.” According to Alhurra, September 3, 2024, this proposal may be one of the terms of the new agreement, leading to the retention of specific Turkish military bases in several northern Syrian areas or even the establishment of new ones in regions currently under Russian control.

Thus, expanding Turkey’s incursion into northern Syria under the Adana Agreement could expose the Autonomous Administration and the SDF to increasing pressure, where these forces would find themselves caught between the Syrian regime and Turkish forces on one side and Russian collusion on the other. At that point, the U.S. presence would become a crucial factor in preventing and obstructing such agreements or mitigating their risks to the Autonomous Administration areas.

 

What Are Russia’s Objectives and Messages by Hinting at Reviving the Adana Agreement?

  • Given that the terms of the Adana Agreement are difficult to implement at present, it can be said that Russia is seeking to bring Turkey and Syria closer by directing both parties to combat the Kurds. By focusing on this “common ground,” Russia is attempting to create space for cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, paving the way for a gradual normalization of relations.
  • The Adana Agreement could be used as a tool to pressure the SDF and the Kurds into rapprochement with the Syrian regime. This, in turn, could push the SDF away from relying on the United States and encourage them to seek protection from Russia and the Syrian regime instead of Washington. This intention can be inferred from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements in early September 2024, when he warned the Kurds and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria of “a fate similar to that of the Afghans who trusted Washington.”
  • Russia aims to reduce the American role in northeastern Syria and solidify its influence as the primary mediator in the region. The revival of the agreement would bolster Moscow’s position as a guarantor of regional understandings and allow it to play a larger role in shaping Syria’s future. Thus, Moscow is reminding the Autonomous Administration of the importance of its role in balancing Turkey and Syria, signaling that they could benefit from their relationship with Russia to avoid greater threats.
  • This move may also carry a message to Turkey, suggesting that cooperation with Damascus under the Adana Agreement could fulfill its security interests. However, in return, Turkey would need to draw closer to Russia’s orbit and distance itself from the U.S. axis. It seems Turkey is partially responding to this Russian demand by recently submitting a request to join the BRICS group, according to “Omer Celik,” the spokesperson for the Justice and Development Party. He stated, “Our president has repeatedly confirmed that we want to become members of BRICS… the process is ongoing now,” as reported by Agence France-Presse on September 3, 2024.

Vision:

In the current circumstances, it seems that reactivating the Adana Agreement without amendments will not achieve the goals of the parties seeking its revival. Turkey, despite its desire to use the agreement to secure its own security interests, finds itself forced to negotiate with a regime that, this time, will impose its own conditions, backed by Russian and Iranian support. The Syrian regime may seek to amend the agreement to ensure a partial or complete Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria. However, the greatest risk remains that any agreement could open the door to legitimizing Turkey’s permanent presence on Syrian soil, which threatens Syria’s sovereignty and further complicates the political and security landscape.

Syria has witnessed significant changes over the past decade, including U.S. intervention in Syria and its role in establishing and supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These changes make it difficult for Ankara and Damascus to fully implement the agreement’s terms. If Turkey were to comply fully with the agreement, the Syrian opposition could face a dire situation, as these factions would then be classified as “terrorist” under new understandings. This would expose them to attacks from Syrian government forces and compel Turkey to abandon its support, leading to significant losses for the opposition.

It appears that Russia aims to exploit the Adana Agreement as a diplomatic and security tool to push Turkey and Syria toward cooperation against the Autonomous Administration. Russia’s goal is not necessarily to fully activate the agreement, but to encourage Damascus and Ankara to focus on their shared interest—confronting the Kurds—in order to achieve its broader strategic interests in Syria and the region.

Turkey’s recent shift in its foreign policy, including its normalization of relations with Arab countries such as Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to seize power, its improved relations with Iraq after Turkey’s unsuccessful attempt to control northern Iraq up to Mosul, and its efforts to normalize ties with Damascus after the opposition and the Brotherhood’s failure to overthrow Assad, has driven Ankara to change its strategy. Instead of relying on Islamist groups and military force, Turkey now seeks to expand its influence in these countries through reconciliation and agreements. This shift in Turkish strategy is a result of the failure of earlier attempts to achieve the desired goals, prompting Ankara to focus on security and economic diplomacy, rebuilding bridges with ruling Arab regimes through economic and security cooperation agreements rather than ideological or military confrontation.

This suggests that Turkey is now seriously pursuing agreements, both public and secret, with Damascus to combat the Autonomous Administration and restore the situation in Syria to pre-2011, returning borders and oil regions to the regime’s control.

Translated by: Al-Furat Center for Studies – Translation Department