By Waleed Choli \u2013 Researcher at al-Furat Center for Studies<\/p>\n
Available in Arabic<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n From the moment the September 11 attacks were described as a new declaration of war against the United States, Washington began to view extremist Islamic groups as the primary threat to its national security. However, this classification was not always fixed, but rather changed according to the political and strategic context.<\/p>\n The war on terrorism began with slogans of total eradication, but over time it has slipped into a more pragmatic approach based on taming and reintegrating extremist groups, or at least controlling their behavior to serve American interests and national security.<\/p>\n This approach was tested in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it seems to have reappeared in a new form in the Syrian arena, where this approach has become more prominent, as Washington has moved towards following a policy of flexible diplomacy in dealing with extremist Islamic organizations, instead of the military confrontation that we have seen with \u201cAl-Qaeda\u201d and the \u201cIslamic State\u201d organization.<\/p>\n This was evident in the remarkable support that the new Damascus authority received from Washington during the past months, which was initially manifested in President Trump\u2019s meeting with the head of the new Damascus authority, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the promises that Trump announced regarding lifting the sanctions on Syria. This would be a significant turning point in the international stance towards the new authority in Damascus, the latest of which was al-Shara\u2019s attendance at the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the remarkable attention he received from the American administration, through opening the doors of the most important American institutions to him, sparking controversy about Washington’s new stance on the Syrian issue, many considered the overall regional issues related to it to be an unprecedented political duplicity on the part of Washington and its Western allies, which raises questions about the background and motives behind the American openness to the new authority in Damascus and known for its Salafist-Jihadist background, the question arises whether \u201cNew Syria\u201d could bear the hallmarks of an \u201cAmerican success\u201d based on its overlapping approaches, or whether it is merely an experimental phase for preconceived theories of the American and Western decision-making center, aimed at employing extremism in pursuit of broader objectives.<\/p>\n Taming as a strategic option<\/strong><\/p>\n Over the past years of America\u2019s war on terror, it has been widely believed that military force is the only tool Washington uses to confront extremist organizations. However, field experiences, especially those it followed in Iraq with the \u201cAwakenings\u201d during the years (2006-2008), and its alliance with Sunni fighters who were linked to al-Qaeda, Similarly, in Afghanistan, where the war strategy against the Taliban changed, followed by the 2020 Doha Agreement which led to the withdrawal of US forces and the transfer of power to the Taliban, in exchange for the Taliban’s commitment not to provide safe haven for terrorist groups, and finally to the Syrian experience and Washington’s avoidance of direct confrontation with some jihadist factions throughout the years of the crisis including the Nusra Front \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham\u201d and allowing it a functional role based on confronting Iran and the Assad regime, it showed that there are other methods that American administrations have followed to contain extremism that go beyond relying on direct military force. In this context, several documents and reports from important research centers reveal a different approach, which relies on the use of intellectual and diplomatic tools to contain extremism. Among the most important of these centers is the RAND Corporation, the research brain of the American political and military establishment, where the majority of its studies and reports become a primary reference for decision-makers particularly on issues of national security, counterterrorism, and foreign policy. Likewise, Chatham House, or the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which is one of the most prominent European research centers on foreign policy, provides analyses and direct recommendations to decision-makers in Britain and the European Union, where it addressed the Syrian issue, the role of Islamic groups, and the limits of dealing with them, which made it a reference for understanding the West\u2019s orientations in managing the conflict.<\/p>\n The majority of these reports [1]<\/a>share the emphasis that \u201ctaming terrorism\u201d or \u201ccontaining extremist groups\u201d requires diplomatic strategies balanced between flexibility and firmness, starting with military and political pressure, then dangling the threat of diplomatic and institutional support, in cooperation with regional and international actors. Then the focus should be on relationships and political and social empowerment, so that they are easier to control and transform into a functional tool for achieving political balance in crisis areas. According to these strategies, the terrorist threats of extremist groups can be reduced without direct military escalation against them, while taking into account the challenges and potential effects on regional and international security.<\/p>\n This pragmatism is nothing but a revival of an old logic whose roots go back to the 1950s, when Washington relied on using Islamic movements as tools in the game of great balances, by supporting political Islam in the Cold War, to form a barrier against the communist tide, within the framework of the \u201cGreen Islamic Belt\u201d project. This was evident in its indirect support for the Islamic Revolution in Iran, with European acquiescence, and also in its support for the jihadist movements in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the late 1970s. Therefore, America is reproducing the same idea, but in the language of taming terrorism, not by explicitly endorsing it.<\/p>\n Al-Nusra is the most suitable option for taming<\/strong><\/p>\n Most Western research centers have addressed the concept of \u201ctaming\u201d in their approaches to combating terrorism, but this concept has taken on different meanings depending on the stage and the political situation. While some reports[2]<\/a> have focused on the possibility of taming groups classified on terrorism lists, and investing in them instead of confronting them, other reports, such as \u201cAl-Nusra Front (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), while keeping Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the category of enemies, as they are transnational, saw that moderate Islamic movements represent the most suitable pillar for restoring political balance in Syria and the region.<\/p>\n Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this vision was the RAND Corporation in its 2007 report[3]<\/a>, which called for supporting \u201cmoderate\u201d Islamic movements that are less extreme intellectually and politically, to stand up to political Islam movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and transnational jihadist groups. The authors of the report found the ideal model for this in the \u201cMadkhali\u201d movement attributed to the Saudi Sheikh Rabee\u2019 al-Madkhali, as it calls for obedience to the Muslim ruler, no matter how honest he is, rejects any form of political opposition, and focuses on doctrine, worship and obedience more than involvement in public affairs. However, this movement, despite its peaceful nature, does not believe in democracy or public freedoms, but rather promotes blind obedience and \u201cdemonizes\u201d the opposition.<\/p>\n Herein lies the great paradox, and the question that stands at the heart of the policy of \u201ctaming\u201d: to which category does Al-Nusra Front belong? And why was it chosen from among all the Islamic organizations to be the possible alternative to the regime?<\/p>\n Although both Al-Nusra and ISIS originated from the same Salafist-jihadist roots, their paths diverged. ISIS saw the establishment of the caliphate as an immediate and non-negotiable duty, and adhered to the strict excommunication of anyone who did not pledge allegiance to the caliph, while Al-Nusra adopted a more gradual and pragmatic approach based on the idea that empowerment precedes the establishment of a caliphate, and that winning over society is more important than subjugating it by force. This approach developed clearly after its transformation into \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham,\u201d where it sought to conceal its jihadist characteristics through relative openness to civil and media activity, and allowing the formation of civil administrations that include technocratic figures, while keeping the real decision in the hands of the security and military apparatus that maintains its ideological rigidity.<\/p>\n In this sense, ISIS can be classified as a radical current within Salafist-jihadist thought, as it believes that legitimacy stems from force and immediate empowerment, while Al-Nusra represents the pragmatic current that believes that survival requires compromise and flexibility, even at the expense of doctrinal purity therefore, it confined its activity to the Syrian interior, and raised the slogan of \u201coverthrowing the regime\u201d instead of \u201csupporting the nation,\u201d which indicates cross-border jihadism, which made it more likely to be an experimental subject for the policy of taming.<\/p>\n But what is interesting is not just the transformation itself, but the similarity of Al-Nusra to the \u201cMadkhali\u201d movement itself, despite the methodological contradiction between them. Both pledge allegiance to the ruler, regardless of his legitimacy and integrity, and both reject opposition, dismiss the idea of \u200b\u200bpublic freedoms, and believe in obedience as a condition of faith. The only difference is that \u201cMadkhali\u201d is not jihadist, and adopted religious obedience from within the system, while \u201cAl-Nusra\u201d practiced it as a parallel coup authority, while implicitly retaining its jihadist ideology.<\/p>\n Thus, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gradually transformed into an updated version of Islam that could be tamed from the perspective of Western American decision-makers; a religious authority in character, political in function.<\/p>\n This is where the fundamental paradox emerges, revealing the depth of the American-Western project in Syria, and how to combine jihadism and moderation to produce a form of Islam that is manageable and controllable; a jihadist and pragmatic one that can resemble moderation, and is open to building alliances even with adversaries, which constituted the ideal embodiment of the policy of taming terrorism in the Syrian arena.<\/p>\n \n Stages of preparation and empowerment<\/strong><\/p>\n Based on the \u201ctaming\u201d strategy that began to take shape in Western American decision-making circles since 2014, early questions arose about the possible alternative to the Damascus regime in the event of its fall, especially with the fragmentation of the political opposition and the \u201cFree Army\u201d factions, and their lack of cohesion and national will.<\/p>\n At this stage, indications increased that the Nusra Front (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) was becoming the most capable candidate to fill the security and administrative vacuum, given its strict organization and field control, despite its designation on international terrorism lists. Some American and British statements during that period reflected aspects of this shift.<\/p>\n The most prominent example is the statement made by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken[4]<\/a>to the Associated Press on December 14, 2024, during a press conference in Aqaba, in which he explicitly stated that \u201cUS officials were in direct contact with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham within the context of the political transition in Syria.\u201d This is the first official confirmation from Washington of the existence of contact with \u201cthe organization\u201d despite its classification on the US terrorism lists.<\/p>\n In May 2025, former US Ambassador Robert Ford revealed to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs[5]<\/a>his meetings with the leader of the organization (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) in 2023. The latter had been invited to work with a British organization specializing in conflict resolution, with the aim of moving him from the world of terrorism to the world of politics and diplomacy. Al-Sharaa acknowledged that his strategies in Iraq were not suitable for application in densely populated areas such as northwestern Syria, which indicates that the cross-border jihadist strategy is no longer part of his organizational and intellectual agenda.<\/p>\n It may not be sufficient to build a definitive picture of a prior relationship between Ahmed al-Sharaa and former CIA Director David Petraeus based solely on the insinuations that emerged in the interview in New York, but a convincing view can be formed by inferring from Petraeus’s statement he said: \u201cThe success of Ahmad al-Sharaa as the leader of the government in Damascus is our success\u2026 I know much more about his past than anyone can imagine.\u201d[6]<\/a><\/p>\n From this we can understand that preparation policies have taken on an organized form through specific mechanisms, namely:<\/p>\n When the \u201cAuthority\u201d later headed towards the capital Damascus, it seemed as though the planned scenario had been completed: a relatively tamed Islamic force, with a disciplined military record and a decent organizational capacity compared to the \u201cNational Army\u201d factions, which were dominated by mercenary activity, but at the same time subject to international monitoring and pressure, making it an ideal tool in the game of balances.<\/p>\n However, the American openness was not absolute, as there were red lines that Washington had clearly drawn, namely that any attempt by the \u201cAuthority\u201d to return to the cross-border jihadist project, this will lead it to face sanctions and military campaigns in the context of combating terrorism, and any targeting of ethnic and religious components in Syria will strip it of the political cover that was implicitly granted to it. Therefore, the relationship was characterized by a mixture of pressure and containment.<\/p>\n Thus, in the name of political realism, the United States dealt with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the period before and after the fall of the Assad regime. Instead of repeating the discourse of complete eradication that it uses with the organizations of \u201cAl-Qaeda and the Islamic State\u201d, this time it preferred to put the organization in a cage of conditions to become a tamed local authority subject to international control, and used as a bargaining chip in regional power balances and Western interests.<\/p>\n Washington’s objectives in its taming strategy in Syria<\/strong><\/p>\n The American and Western motivation behind the \u201ctaming\u201d strategy towards the new Damascus authority and its president, al-Sharaa, can be summarized in several points:<\/p>\n Thus, the American openness to the authority of Ahmed al-Sharaa is not just a passing political choice, but a practical application to ensure relative stability in order to achieve certain goals in Syria and the region.<\/p>\n Challenges and limitations of the taming strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cOne cannot tame a tiger into a cat by massaging it, one cannot make peace with cruelty, and one cannot negotiate with an incendiary bomb.\u201d With these words spoken by former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, we can understand the challenges facing American policymakers in dealing with jihadist forces around the world. In the context of the Syrian crisis, this saying is embodied in the complex conflict between trying to contain jihadist groups such as \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham\u201d, and integrating them into the political process, while maintaining stability that allows local communities to engage in the political process and achieves international balances.<\/p>\n Despite American and Western arrangements, the \u201ctaming\u201d strategy faces significant challenges stemming from the organization\u2019s jihadist nature, both ideologically and organizationally, the unique realities of the Syrian situation, and regional influences that may strongly hinder Washington and the West from achieving their objectives in Syria, as previously mentioned. Among the most important of these challenges and constraints are:<\/p>\n a- The \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham\u201d organization does not differ ideologically from the orientations of \u201cAl-Qaeda and the Islamic State\u201d in terms of ideological and organizational roots and Salafist-Jihadist doctrine. The only difference is that \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham\u201d relies on pragmatism as a means to achieve its goals in building the Caliphate, while the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State organizations insist on the approach of imposing the Caliphate by force across borders. Therefore, both share the goal of establishing a caliphate state, and this will probably pose a pivotal threat in the medium term to the security and stability of the region, as well as to the political interests of America and the West, according to their definition of terrorist organizations.<\/p>\n b- One of the most distinctive characteristics of \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham,\u201d which it shares even with the \u201cmoderate Madkhali\u201d movement, is its rejection and demonization of the political opposition, and its lack of openness to pluralism, democratic principles, and civil society. This is confirmed by its banning of all political parties as soon as it came to power in Damascus. In addition to the massacres it committed in the Syrian coast and south against the Alawite and Druze sects, and its military clashes with the Kurds in northern and eastern Syria despite the agreements concluded, which further complicates the task of taming it. Every step taken by the \u201cAuthority\u201d could lead to further popular discontent and local conflicts, which contradicts the Western strategy aimed at involving all Syrians in the political process, and its numerous recommendations regarding the security of minorities and national and sectarian components in Syria.<\/p>\n c- Despite the \u201cAuthority\u2019s\u201d claim to have changed its intellectual and organizational path by changing its name, which referred to supporting the Islamic nation, to \u201cHay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham,\u201d in an indication that it had changed its cross-border jihadist path towards the Syrian path, in its organizational and military approach it still follows the same jihadist path. This was evident in her intellectual discourse and her inclination towards transnational extremist organizations, a clear indication of her potential return to a transnational jihadist approach. This would constitute a transgression of the red lines drawn by the United States, the West, and Israel in particular.<\/p>\n Therefore, the current Syrian reality shows that there are no simple or direct solutions. Balancing between taming and firmness remains the most complex option, as it puts the United States and the West before two main possibilities: either continuing the policy of taming through containment and partial guidance of \u201cHayat Tahrir al-Sham\u201d, while maintaining strict red lines, or shifting to a policy of toughness if the organization crosses these lines or fails to meet the conditions of taming.<\/p>\n American policy in Syria represents a stark example of the pragmatism of great powers in dealing with international crises. It is not based on fixed political principles but rather on assumptions that can be modified with every change in the situation. The United States saw the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to reshape the Syrian landscape to serve its own interests. The approach of \u201ctaming terrorism\u201d was quickly adopted instead of the option of direct confrontation, based on previous experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where ideological opponents were turned into situational partners. However, this policy did not last long in the face of the complexities of the Syrian reality, as the events of the coast and then Suwaida emerged as a revealing factor of the limits of the \u201ccontainment\u201d approach.<\/p>\n The massacres committed against the Alawites and the Druze sect, and their regional and international repercussions, forced Washington to reconsider its strategy and prompted it to think about more decisive options, including moving from managing the crisis through mediation to playing a direct role that closely resembles the American experience in Iraq after 2003.<\/p>\n Washington has shown, through the statements of its envoy and its recent military and diplomatic moves, that Syria is no longer just a local or even regional issue, but has become a testing ground for reshaping the entire Middle Eastern balance of power, whether by curbing Iran\u2019s return, controlling Turkish ambitions, or securing Israel\u2019s vital space.<\/p>\n In contrast, the new Syrian authority, with its fragile structure and narrow ideological background, was merely a tool within a broader American project intended to produce a weak, controllable regime that would accommodate forces that were yesterday classified on terrorism lists, but what happened was that this authority, with direct Turkish support, changed the functional equation of this authority and turned it into a source of threat to Syria and its regional surroundings.<\/p>\n In conclusion, it can be said that the future of American policy in Syria will remain governed by the equation of variables, not constants. Every exceptional event, such as the fall of the regime, the invasion of the coast and Suwaida, or the undertaking of military action against northern and eastern Syria, opens the door to reformulating the strategy. Either by returning to the path of \u201ctaming\u201d and diplomatic engagement, or by going to a more stringent approach based on military pressure and direct diplomacy, it is not unlikely, in light of this shift in the Syrian scene and the American position, that Washington will move, through its new policy, to adopt a policy of force to reconsider the transitional phase led by the Damascus authority.<\/p>\n The aim is to form a rescue government under its direct supervision, similar to the experience of \u201cPaul Bremer\u201d in Iraq, when he took over the management of the transitional phase with broad executive powers.<\/p>\n Such a scenario would give all Syrians effective participation in the government, and would give the United States the upper hand in controlling the course of political transition and controlling the joints of the new state, while keeping Resolution 2254 as a reference framework to give international legitimacy to what it seeks to impose.<\/p>\n Finally, Washington is still continuing on the path of taming, but according to the mechanisms of diplomatic pressure and regional mediators, and it seems that this policy is based on a \u201cstep by step\u201d mechanism, in the context of the local integration process. That is, to the extent that the \u201cAuthority\u201d shows openness to integration with the Syrian components, foremost among them the administration of northern and eastern Syria, and guaranteeing Israel\u2019s security, to that extent Washington will open the doors of legitimacy for it and lift the sanctions imposed on it.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> RAND Corporation, \u201cThe Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency\u201d, 2014:\u00a0https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/research_reports\/RR609.html<\/a><\/p>\n \n [2]<\/a> Chathamhouse, \u201cWestern Policy Towards Syria: Applying Lessons Learned\u201d:\u00a0https:\/\/share.google\/https:\/\/kalam.chathamhouse.org\/ar\/articles\/western-policy-towards-syria-applying-lessons-learned\/<\/a><\/p>\n \n [3]<\/a> RAND Corporation, \u201cThe Future of Syria: Political and Economic Challenges\u201d:\u00a0https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/monographs\/MG574.html<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Associated Press, \u201cBlinken discusses Syria, Assad, and HTS transition\u201d, 2025:\u00a0https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/blinken-syria-assad-hts-transition-mideast-5fcff887a74dc9ec36e483c0b601a8c<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> \u201cInterview with Robert Ford on Syrian conflict\u201d, 2025:\u00a0https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=dKBFKcKZ8UU<\/a><\/p>\n \n [6]<\/a> Rudaw Arabic, \u201cDavid Petraeus to Rudaw: The Kurds have other friends besides the mountains, and that includes America,\u201d 2025:\u00a0https:\/\/www.rudawarabia.net\/arabic\/interview\/181020251<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By Waleed Choli \u2013 Researcher at al-Furat Center for Studies Available in Arabic From the moment the September 11 attacks were described as a new declaration of war against the United States, Washington began to view extremist Islamic groups as the primary threat to its national security. However, this classification was not always fixed, but …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":69,"featured_media":2640,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[130],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2639","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-current-issues"],"yoast_head":"\n\n
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